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THE NEEDS OF MEMBERS IN A LEGITIMATE
DEMOCRATIC STATE
john a. powell*
This symposium focuses on the needs of workers and
whether the state is meeting those needs in the areas of
bankruptcy, unemployment, and welfare. All of these areas
are important in their own right, yet together they suggest a
more comprehensive look at the welfare state and the role it
does and should play in addressing the needs of its members.
One could argue that other critical areas have been excluded,
such as health care, education, and housing. In fact, it would
be difficult to come up with a comprehensive list that would
adequately define the needs of members. The reason for this
will become clear in my article below. Instead of trying to
supplement this list, I will try to develop a larger context in
which to think about how we should proceed in meeting the
needs of members of our democratic state and the appropriate
role of government.
I will assert that it is membership itself that is the start-
ing point for the appropriate bounds of inquiry, and that ways
of thinking about membership itself must be called into ques-
tion. I will also assert that discerning the needs, particularly
social, that must be addressed by the state is a question aris-
ing from the membership process. In our democratic society,
it is participation in a strong democratic process that defines
those needs. In doing so, it is not only the needs for members
that are delineated but also a description of what the role for
a legitimate democratic state should be. I will further assert
that the primary need is to be a member and that the primary
need associated with this membership is the right and capac-
* Williams Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Moritz College of
Law, Ohio State University; Executive Director, Kirwan Institute for the Study
of Race and Ethnicity, Ohio State University. I would like to thank Stephen
Menendian for his hard and thoughtful work on the article.
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ity to further define needs. In more succinct terms, the pri-
mary need after membership is effective participation or civic
freedom.
There are two normative questions that must be ad-
dressed before substantively engaging the question of
whether the United States, or any nation, is meeting the
needs of its citizens. First, what should count as a need and
how does context help us both frame and answer this ques-
tion? Second, what is the role of the government in meeting
or addressing this identified need? The reader will not be
surprised that there is no consensus or easy answer to either
of these questions because the normative criteria chosen for
determining what is meant by "need" provides the basis for
evaluating whether needs are being met. As an alternative to
engaging in a discourse without a resolution, I will try to set
out a process for thinking about these two questions. It is
important to note that we are concerned with the needs of
members of any given state and with the legitimate role of
the government in responding to those needs. The needs that
one has outside of a particular state may be different from the
needs in a particular state. I will also claim that different
states may generate different needs. Even if a member of a
particular state has a need, this in and of itself does not re-
quire a response from a state. Implicit in the question
whether a state is meeting its members' needs are both the
recognition of needs under that particular state and the rec-
ognition of some state obligation to meet those needs.
I. NEED FOR WHAT?
In order to engage the question seriously, one has to start
by examining what is meant by "need." The concern here is
not just with need but with a certain type of need. This arti-
cle will try to identify the process of identifying needs, recog-
nizing the appropriate needs that one should expect the gov-
ernment to meet. Since we are interested in whether the
government is addressing these needs, our attention gravi-
tates toward a particular direction and away from other con-
cerns. I
1. It would probably not be controversial to assert that in the United
States, the government has no affirmative role in meeting our spiritual needs.
Even this observation has some complexities that suggest we must be provi-
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One way to distinguish clearly betweeni definitions of
need is to compare answers to the question: "need for what?"
The rephrased question reveals the chosen metric. One po-
tential answer is the need for physical survival. Indeed, a
minimum welfare state 'seems to be concerned with need in
this limited way.' The most limited perspective of thinking
about need in immediate relation to human survival is star-
vation: preventing people from experiencing abject starvation.
This limited way of thinking about needs may answer one
question but leave another unresolved. Certainly there is a
need for food and other things for physical survival. So in
this sense, there can be no question that these are needs.
Yet, the need for survival does not tell us why the govern-
ment should be concerned with these needs or how these and
other needs are to be ordered or met.
There are others who believe that the role of a welfare
state is more robust-to keep people from experiencing deg-
radation or extreme poverty. The focus under this conception
of need is to measure the disparity between what people have
against some objective standard, and then transfer the differ-
ence. We may begin then with the assertion that the survival
of the individual above abject poverty is a base line from
which to define a category of needs. Although most may
agree that there is a need in the area of physical survival, and
if possible the avoidance of abject poverty, this does little to
sional even in making this assertion. We feel relatively sure making this
statement because of the agreement that we live in a secular democracy, and a
market-oriented society. In a theocracy, there may be less reason for any confi-
dence that the government has no role in meeting spiritual needs. In our soci-
ety, there are reasons to be more tentative even about the question of spiritual
needs despite an immediate inclination to think of this as an obvious place
where the government should not be involved. Part of the reason for our unre-
flected assurance is that in our society there is no positive role for government
in addressing our spiritual needs. We accept that we are a secular society
where matters of spirituality are private. There are a number of thinkers who
are questioning if in fact the secular and spiritual should be or even can be kept
separate. See john powell, Lessons from Suffering" How Social Justice Informs
Spirituality, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). For an excellent dis-
cussion of lack and suffering, see generally DAVID R. LOY, THE GREAT
AWAKENING: A BUDDHIST SOCIAL THEORY (2003). Loy asserts that the sense of
lack is the heart of spiritual questioning that profoundly impacts both our spiri-
tual and secular suffering. See id. The inquiry of whether the government is
meeting the needs of its citizens and workers invites a closer look at needs.
2. One can think of the social welfare system as a safety net that stands to
prevent the untimely end of the person. Safety from what? Falling into or out
of what?
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help us think about what other needs we should be concerned
about, nor does it resolve serious doubts over the legitimate
scope of government action in meeting those needs.3 Even
when one has a threadbare notion of the welfare state, one
immediately treads into controversy over the role and legiti-
macy of the government in terms of addressing need.
Nozick and others would say that the role of the state is
not to prevent people from experiencing abject poverty, but to
prevent people from killing each other, and to protect private
property and wealth.4 Under this second approach to need,
one might give to the poor for the purpose of maintaining sta-
bility and order, and to avoid revolt by the have-nots. Within
this conception of need, welfare programs are instrumental to
the survival of the state and the protection of property.5 Al-
though one might have a legitimate role for the government
in addressing needs under this approach, the focus has
shifted from the needs of the poor to the needs of the well-off.
In answering "need for what?," need here is defined as stabil-
ity and protection of wealth and the state itself, not for sur-
vival of the destitute individual. Within this approach we are
invited to look at the needs of the propertied on the one hand
and the needs of the state itself on the other. It is to the in-
terest in the protection of property that we turn first.
This view of the state has been historically associated
with Hobbes.6 He asserts that people leave the state of na-
ture and enter civil society for the protection of their prop-
erty, thus defining the role of government. This Hobbesian
view has been rightly criticized on a number of grounds. It is
based on a flawed view that property exists before the state.
3.
The political-economic discourse is a tax-and-transfer-style social de-
mocracy. Its intellectual background in the political economy of the
second half of the twentieth century was the attempt to wed the re-
quirements of a countercyclical management of the economy with a
commitment to popularizing consumption opportunities. Its philoso-
phical expression has been a redistributive theory of justice focusing on
resource outcomes rather than on institutional arrangements, and on
equality rather than on empowerment or greatness.
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, xxxvii-iii (2d ed. 2001).
4. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1981).
5. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
6. See Bishop John Bramball, The Catching of Leviathan, in LEVIATHAN
AUTHORITATIVE TEXT BACKGROUNDS INTERPRETATIONS 279 (Richard E. Flath-
man & David Johnston eds., 1997).
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This is clearly wrong. In a meaningful sense, the state is not
designed to protect property. Instead, it is the state itself
that calls various property regimes into being.7 At a deeper
level, the person that exists in a state of nature is so different
from a citizen or a person in civil society that it makes little
sense to argue about what the state owes the person entering
the civil society. As a heuristic device, the Hobbesian position
can be thought of as assertions about legitimacy. Why would
an individual leave the state of nature and give up certain
freedoms to enter into a civil society with a coercive state?
Recognize that this question is anachronistic; it tries to pro-
ject the modern individual with property into a pre-modern
state of nature. In a pre-modern state not only did the indi-
vidual as we think of her not exist but neither did our concept
of freedom.' The foundational argument of Hobbes, and more
recently Nozick, for a state whose main function is the protec-
tion of private property is so flawed that it has limited heuris-
tic value and need not concern us further at this point.9 Hav-
ing examined the flaws in the formulation of need and
correlative role of government as a means to protect property
under this second approach, in which the interests of the
well-off are primary, we now examine the other end sought by
the state within the broader rubric of the need for stability.
Revolt does not just threaten the members of the state; at
some level it threatens the state itself. A state, especially a
democratic state, can maintain stability only if certain needs
of its members are being met. ° The assumption that the
state has an interest in stability is not at issue. Nor do I take
exception to the claim that the state has some obligation to
the propertied. I only challenge the claim that there is no le-
gitimate state role in meeting needs for the purpose of provid-
7. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). In this case, Justice Mar-
shall makes it clear that the regime of property is a function of the state and
does not precede the state. See id. at 591-92.
8. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF WESTERN
CULTURE 1-2, 10 (1991).
9. The type of state that Nozick and Hobbes defend can be thought of as a
capitalistic state with an instrumental requirement for welfare as opposed to a
democratic state. See discussion of Rawls, infra Part II; see also discussion in-
fra Part IV.
10. "We cannot do without the concept of entitlement because it is funda-
mental to citizenship. Citizens have rights to which they are entitled by law,
and losing this understanding endangers the republic." LINDA GORDON, PITIED
BUT NOT ENTITLED 288 (1994).
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ing for the less-well off. Political philosopher Michael Walzer
suggests that all states are by their nature welfare states,
meaning that all states owe something to their members that
they do not owe to nonmembers. "' When a state fails to de-
liver, it loses legitimacy from its members who are necessary
for the state to exist. In other words, all states must engage
in some legitimating process. While stability is important, it
should be based on legitimacy. This is especially true in a
democracy. The state can avoid instability of revolt and revo-
lution by remaining legitimate and open to change. This is
clearly exemplified in the United States Declaration of Inde-
pendence. 2 If one accepts the position that a state requires
some degree of legitimacy to exist and that legitimacy is ob-
tained in large part by addressing the needs of its members,
the interrelationship between the states' needs and the needs
of its members becomes clear.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that there is an
apparent tension here. As suggested above, the needs of per-
sons are in part influenced by where they find themselves in
civil society. If this is true, how could there be space for a
critical examination of what the state and its institutional ar-
rangements afford and how they meet the needs of its mem-
bers? The apparent tension is resolved when one realizes
that while the institutional and structural arrangements in
society influence the needs of its members, they are not com-
pletely coterminous. First, there are a number of social loca-
tions in society; and second, there is always space for human
wants and needs to extend beyond the current arrangements
despite the influence of those arrangements. 3 What should
be clear at this point is that the legitimacy of the state and
the human need of its members, however defined or per-
ceived, are often bound up.
11. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 68 (1983); see also infra text accompanying note 58.
12. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776); see also
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 11 (1984)
("To gain a higher freedom from the context is to make the context available to
the transforming will and imagination rather than to bring it to a universal
resting point.").
13. See UNGER, supra note 12, at 7-13. "Context-breaking remains both ex-
ceptional and transitory. Either it fails and leaves the pre-established context
in place, or it generates another context that can sustain it and the beliefs or
relationship allied to it." Id. at 9.
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I have already mentioned the need for survival as a need
at the level of the person. Even this need is not always rec-
ognized as a social need that is valued in society. While the
hungry person may recognize this as a need, it may not be a
need that is recognized by the larger society. A way of re-
framing this is to think again about individual needs that re-
quire a social response in order for the state to maintain le-
gitimacy. During most of the United States' early history,
there was no recognition of eradicating individual hunger as a
legitimate social need that required a social response. Partly,
this lack of response occurred because of an assumption or
dominant story that there was enough opportunity in the way
of land and work that virtually all who wanted to could avoid
hunger.14
In light of the foregoing observations, a third approach to
thinking about need is to frame it in terms of legitimacy, with
a focus on human freedom. This turn away from thinking
about physical necessities in the narrow sense is very useful
and important. Economist Amartya Sen boldly points out in
Development as Freedom that
African Americans in the United States are relatively poor
compared to American whites, but much richer than peo-
ple in the third world. [H]owever, African Americans have
an absolutely lower chance of reaching mature ages than
do people of many third world societies, such as China, or
Sri Lanka, or parts of India.
In other words, he is suggesting that if you look at income,
and if you correct for price variations across the world, Afri-
can Americans have a lower life expectancy than people in
China or Sri Lanka with not just equivalent income, but
much lower income. Thus, Sen has defined poverty "as the
deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as low-
ness of incomes, which is the standard criterion of identifica-
tion of poverty."16 What Sen is suggesting is that income is a
proxy for something else. Moreover, there are many meas-
14. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY app. at 165 (1987). Wilson notes
that "people unable to make it in the East were advised to go West" where there
was an abundance of fertile land. Id. After industrialization, however, this
view began to change.
15. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 6 (1999).
16. Id. at 87.
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ures of need, among which income is merely one. "Growth
... of individual income can, of course, be important as means
to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by members of the society
But freedoms depend also on other determinants, such as so-
cial and economic arrangements (for example, facilities for
education and health care) as well as political and civic
rights."
17
If income is a proxy, what is it a proxy for? The task of
defining need is hampered by the lingering burden of the
more relevant policy question, the role of government in ad-
dressing need, rather than the theoretical difficulty of defin-
ing need. This fact explains the predominance of narrow
definitions of need. Nonetheless, the commonality between
all measures of need is that they are attempting to evaluate
some standard of well-being, even if indirectly.18 For this rea-
son, the old paradigms focused on well-being as the end goal.
In defining poverty as the deprivation of capabilities, Sen
proposes that freedom is the most appropriate and directly
relevant perspective to evaluate human need.
II. THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
Sen builds upon the work of the Human Development In-
dex (HDI), which comes out of the United Nations. 9 Human
development, under this index, concerns creating an envi-
ronment in which people can develop their potential and lead
productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and in-
terests. The focus is on human choice: expanding the choices
that people have to lead lives they value. Fundamental to
enlarging choices is building human capabilities-the range
of things that people can do or be in their lives. The most ba-
sic capabilities for human development are to lead long and
healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the re-
sources needed for a decent standard of living, and to be able
to participate in the life of the community. What is crucial
17. Id. at 3.
18. Even the most libertarian view which accepts a role for the state sug-
gests that the protection of property and stability facilitates economic transac-
tions, which are a means to human well-being through the process of economic
growth.
19. UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INIEX, available at
http://hdrc.undp.org.in/content/hdr/india-extracts_2001/chapl.htm (last visited
May 13, 2004).
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for the elimination of unfreedom and poverty is not simply
the mechanical balance of wealth and population, but the
substantive opportunities that people have to earn income.
Although a very thin index of human need, the HDI has a
very robust concept of it. The index avoids detailing the con-
tent for what is necessary for people, but indicates that we
are not just concerned with abject poverty but with expanding
the range of individual choice.
The thrust of Sen's work is that human capabilities
should be the centerpiece of public policy attempts to address
inequality. A focus on development and capacity is more in-
clusive in terms of support. If we are to take seriously the
idea of avoiding poverty, and poverty is not merely the low-
ness of income or similar economic measurement, then need
here is for capacity, with a focus on the removal of capability
deprivations.
If income is not a proxy for capacity, how might we
measure and actualize capacity? What Sen is pointing to is a
critical factor that needs to be examined: institutional struc-
tures and arrangements."° There is a cluster of institutional
arrangements that mediate the achievement of capacity out-
comes, and these institutional arrangements vary from soci-
ety to society. The focus on wealth or well-being, an end
state, ignores the ways in which well-being is actualized and
the complex ways in which structures and arrangements may
inhibit this actualization. Sen, like Unger and Rawls, recog-
nizes that there is no natural or neutral way for institutions
and structures to be arranged.2' The shift in focus from in-
come to capabilities reframes the issue in a way that better
informs how to address the problem of need.
In some societies, income is really a proxy for a job, a
type of job which would provide critically important health
care. Health care in the United States is distributed on the
basis of income. A group of Chinese peasants is more likely to
have access to health care than an African American or poor
American. The institutions in China are geared, or one might
say normalized, in relationship to poor Chinese peasants."
They serve and anticipate the lack of income. In the United
20. See SEN, supra note 15, at 4-5.
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., PETER WILENSK: THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1976).
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States, health care is normalized and designed to serve people
in a certain type of job. If you do not have that type of job,
you are disassociated from the institution that delivers capac-
ity. The income you make may not make up for the lack of
capacity from those institutional arrangements.
What I am suggesting is that when you look at any par-
ticular program, you need to step back and ask what are we
trying to achieve. If you are trying to achieve a certain capac-
ity, then you cannot know whether unemployment insurance,
bankruptcy, or welfare will meet it or not; you have to look at
the institutional arrangements at the cluster. In fact, trying
to assist the needy through one narrow program may be
wasteful of resources designed to meet capability deprivation.
The contrast between India and Sub-Sahara Africa is illustra-
tive. India has higher incidence of under-nutrition than Sub-
Sahara Africa, although it has lower infant mortality, higher
female literacy rates, and a much higher median age at
death.23 Although a greater number of Indian citizens may be
malnourished relative to persons in Sub-Sahara Africa,24 In-
dian citizens may likely have much greater capabilities. Re-
distributing income without taking account of the prevailing
institutional arrangements is inefficient and ineffectual. It
will fail to solve underlying problems of need, and addresses
only piecemeal the larger problem."
Many different scholars approach this idea in many dif-
ferent directions, and yet it is interesting how they all come
out in this way. In the The American Dilemma, a book about
the history of African Americans in the United States, Myrdal
argues that the thing that is distinct about the Negro is not
the poverty, but it is the cumulative economic poverty, the
cumulative deprivation.26 What distinguishes the Negro from
poor whites is not only lack of income, but also his/her being
defied in terms of education, voting rights, and segregation,
23. See SEN, supra note 15, at 99-104 (presenting data about under-
nutrition, infant mortality, female literacy, and life expectancy for Sub-Sahara
Africa and India).
24. See id.
25. Unger makes the same point: "If massive inequalities are rooted in
structural divisions between advanced and backward sectors of the economy,
compensatory transfers would also have to be massive to redress them."
UNGER, supra note 3, at lxviii.
26. GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 77 (Transaction Publishers
1996) (1944).
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and the list goes on. What happens in terms of depressing
the "capacity of the Negro," is not any one of those things, but
the cluster of things creating a vicious cycle.27 Myrdal warns
against thinking about a silver bullet-thinking that one in-
dividual will break the cycle held together by a cluster. Free-
ing people from one structural constraint, say segregation,
will not produce a just outcome if there is a cluster of ar-
rangements oppressing them.
What Sen is also asserting is that needs and poverty are
relational, and that this relational differential is also medi-
tated through the arrangements of institutions and struc-
tures. Sen's criticism of Rawls and utilitarianism28 reveals
how poverty and need are relative to how human beings are
differentially situated. In regard to utilitarianism, the con-
cept of utility cannot escape the problem of being unable to
measure interpersonal discrepancies, because utility is often
a function of how content one is with one's position, regard-
less of the extent of one's opportunities. In that way, an ex-
tremely poor person in a first world country might have a
much lower utility than an even poorer person in a third
world country despite having higher real income. For exam-
ple, African American men still have a shorter life expectancy
than men from third world countries with far less annual in-
come. In the same sense, a Rawlsian primary good index29
cannot be taken separately from the needs one must actually
require, including the Smithian right to dignity. ° Extremely
poor people may not be able to be functioning individuals if
they are ashamed of their status. The full injury of slavery in
American history cannot be understood without realizing that
democracy is among the highest values in American society.
In context of a democratic society, citizenship becomes a need
of the highest order. It is important to recognize the relative
valuation in any given context of any given institution. So
what do we mean by welfare and need? If we are thinking
about it in robust terms, then the cluster of capabilities may
have to be expanded or altered in different contexts with
varying institutional arrangements. We also have to be clear
27. GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 52 (2002).
28. SEN, supra note 15, at 62-63.
29. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
30. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Andrew Skinner ed., 1979) (1776).
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about the outcomes, preferring wholistic approaches to
piecemeal solutions.
Formulation of an answer to the second question posed at
the outset, the role and legitimacy of the government to meet
needs, circumscribes the range of discussion in regards to the
first question based upon the assumption that the more ex-
pansive the answer to the prior question, the more expansive
and costly the role of government. This is not necessarily the
case. The capabilities approach focuses on outcomes-and
when it allocates resources, it does so in a way that may be
more efficient than piecemeal programs, and more likely to
require less expenditure in the future. Moreover, the capa-
bilities approach is oriented toward the issue of need in such
a way as to empower people to meet their own needs. The re-
sult is that fewer resources will be required to address the
needs of those already in poverty. This point will become
clear as we examine the capabilities approach in more detail.
If we are serious about dealing with issues of deprivation and
poverty, the capabilities approach grounded in membership is
the only honest starting place for analysis.
III. HUMAN CAPABILITY AS FREEDOM
What is unique about the capabilities approach is the
centrality of freedom. It would be a mistake to say that what
Sen is proposing is merely a shift in focus designed to recog-
nize the role of institutions or a more cost effective method of
poverty avoidance. For Sen, capabilities are both a means
and an end.
One of Sen's major points is that a famine is not the con-
sequence of lack of food. "A person may be forced into starva-
tion even when there is plenty of food around if he loses his
ability to buy food in the market, through a loss of income (for
example, due to unemployment or the collapse of the market
for goods that he produces and sells to earn a living)."31 In
this way, famine is not caused by the quantum of food, but
the lack of economic power and substantive freedom of indi-
viduals and families to buy food. In the same way, simply si-
phoning funds from tax coffers to the needy does not solve the
underlying problem of dependence because of inadequate op-
portunities and freedom.
31. SEN, supra note 15, at 161.
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Another observation will bring the issue of famine into
focus. Wherever you have robust civic engagement, no matter
how little food, you do not have famine. 2 A famine is a conse-
quence of the lack of democracy: lack of capacity of civic en-
gagement by marginalized people. It is on this point that
John Rawls comes together with Sen in an interesting way.
When Rawls talks about his first principles that may not
be derogated from,33 what is he talking about? In one sense
he is talking about individual freedom: freedom of conscience
and religion. But in another sense, and a more important
sense for us, he is talking about the capacity to be civically
involved-to be involved in the democratic process. One can
wonder: Why is it so important to partake in the democratic
process when people are starving to death? Rawls in a sense
makes the same point: those things will only happen where
people are denied effective participation.' Those evils are
distributed where there is ineffective participation in civic
life. 5 This is why, for Sen, development is freedom, particu-
larly civic freedom.36 Without the space of democracy, people
cannot affect economic crises such as famine, and they cannot
expand their opportunities for affecting civic discourse.
"[W]hen people without political liberty or civil rights do not
lack adequate economic security, . . . they are deprived of
[the] important freedoms in leading their lives and denied the
opportunity to take part in crucial decisions regarding public
affairs."37 The "constitutive" role of freedom presented here is
the primary end of development. It is a general capability of
individuals to lead the kind of lives they value. To grasp the
full scope of what effectively participating in public life im-
32.
The right that members can legitimately claim is of a more general
sort. It undoubtedly includes some version of the Hobbesian right to
life, some claim on communal resources for bare subsistence. No com-
munity can allow its members to starve to death when there is food
available to feed them ... no government of or by or for the community.
The indifference of Britain's rulers during the Irish potato famine in
the 1840s is a sure sign that Ireland was a colony, a conquered land, no
real part of Great Britain.
WALZER, supra note 11, at 79.
33. See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (2001).
34. See id. at pt.IV.
35. See id.
36. See generally SEN, supra note 15.
37. Id. at 16.
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ports, we need to be clear in what we mean by "freedom," a
contested and confounding word.
In Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, Orlando
Patterson traces the origins and development of freedom.38
Several of the things we see in terms of the Athenian and
Greek early conceptions of both freedom and democracy are
interesting. First, freedom is a derivative of slavery. It is not
natural or historical. There was a political context that called
it into being to generate it, but perhaps more importantly
than its generation was how freedom came to be so highly
valued. People came to value freedom, to construct it as a
powerful shared vision of life, as a result of their experience of
and response to slavery and serfdom.
The first group enslaved in large numbers, and therefore
the first group to value individual freedom was women.39 As
women initially valued freedom, men did not care about it.
As they developed a concept of freedom, first they developed
sovereign, then civic, and finally individual. "[Sovereignal
freedom] is the power to act as one pleases, regardless of the
wishes of others, as distinct from personal freedom, which is
the capacity to do as one pleases, insofar as one can."" "Civic
freedom is the capacity of adult members of a community to
participate in life and governance."'" It implies a political
community of sorts. Civic participation and organized politics
first emerged together in Athens. 2 Personal or individual
freedom is the "sense that one ... is not being coerced or re-
strained by another.., and.., that one can do as one pleases
within the limits of other person's desire to do the same."4 3
Sen is acutely aware of the subtle distinctions in what is
meant by freedom. Sen emphasizes the interrelationship be-
tween personal freedom and civic freedom as integral compo-
nents of a larger whole." In this sense, Sen views freedom as
instrumental: each of his enumerated freedoms helps to ad-
vance the general capability of a person. Participation in
civic life in any meaningful sense is conditioned on a number
38. See PATTERSON, supra note 8.
39. Id. at 50-51.
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 3.
44. See generally SEN, supra note 15.
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of instrumental, personal freedoms. The broader base of in-
dividual freedoms, which are constituted by both political lib-
erties and the removal of unfreedoms, expands civic freedom,
which serves to open up for broader discussion the possibili-
ties of social and economic development.
"Development consists of the removal of various types of
unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little op-
portunity of exercising their reasoned agency."45 This refers
to both positive and negative rights. The dominant paradigm
often views positive rights as going beyond what society is re-
quired to provide. Such a dichotomy is vulnerable to attack
on several levels. One of the prevailing assumptions is that
the procedural background is just. If this were true, then a
capabilities approach would not be necessary, because people
would be able to take control of their own lives. Another as-
sumption is that negative rights are less costly and more
natural. An approach focused on human capabilities realizes
that this is false. As a technical matter, all forms of freedom,
positive or negative, are costly because they require enforce-
ment. A fair and carefully rendered judiciary is in the same
cost range as a universal program of health insurance. As a
conceptual matter, the distinction is irrelevant. A lack of re-
gard for both positive and negative rights results in a depri-
vation of freedom. Few would argue that elections should be
called off because they are too expensive.
Development can be seen, it is argued here, as a process of
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy .... Devel-
opment requires the removal of major sources of unfree-
dom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportuni-
ties as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of
public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of re-
pressive states.
In focusing on the positive or negative rights dichotomy,
many often miss the critical role that social opportunities
play in permitting development. Social opportunities become
institutional necessities if people are going to exercise not
only personal freedoms, but also political or civic freedoms.
The classic example of enhancing economic growth through
social opportunity is Japan.47 During the mid-nineteenth cen-
45. SEN, supra note 15, at xii.
46. Id at 3.
47. Id. at 41.
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tury, Japan had a higher rate of literacy than Europe, when
industrialization had not yet arrived in Japan but had gone
on for several decades in Europe.4' The early emphasis on lit-
eracy and health care provided the human resource capital
which enabled massive economic expansion. One of the as-
sumptions underlying the positive and negative rights dichot-
omy is the idea that there can be a clear line dividing worth-
while policy goals and the sort of expenditure that only richer
countries may afford. The example of Japan undermines this
assumption, demonstrating how the distinction may be ir-
relevant under the capabilities approach.
The bottom line is that freedom, for Sen, is instrumental
as well as an end.49 Freedom is the end of development in
that it consists in individual agency. A part of this is partici-
pation in civic life enabling individuals to lead the lives they
have reason to value. Freedom is also a means of develop-
ment in that it makes possible meaningful civic participation.
The directional influence runs two ways. Political freedom
expands meaningful civic freedom, which serves to open up
for broader discussion the possibilities of social and economic
development.
Sovereign freedom, in effect, is the freedom to lord over
someone else. There was a huge debate over the freedom of
white property owners to own slaves that was expressed in
terms of advancing freedom: we need freedom to lord over
others. The second kind of freedom was civic engagement or
civic freedom. Within the sphere of aristocrats that lorded
over the rest of society, there is equality, mutuality, respect,
etc.; but in relationship to someone outside the club, there is
the right to lord over them." Those who are not part of
whichever club we are talking about have no right to regulate
their lives. Under this view, not only is there nothing wrong
with this, there is something right with it.
There are two powerful assumptions at play. The first
assumption suggests that "they" are in some fundamental
sense not deserving. That becomes a powerful justification
for denying membership not easily overcome by empirical
48. Id.
49. See generally SEN, supra note 15.
50. This explains our welfare system: there is an elite with a notion of
equality among themselves-but for those outside the club, there is a notion of
being lorded over. See generally GORDON, supra note 10.
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data. It is either because God has not chosen them, or they
are stigmatized.5 Even if the poor are otherwise good people
and it would be efficient to help them, we should not. It is not
enough to show that these people are not so bad. We are not
supposed to be helping them, so we make up elaborate stories
that this is how things are supposed to be.
In modern times, we do not follow the justification of a
higher authority, but we remain driven by the story of
"otherness," of "not being chosen," hypnotized in a way that
justifies the current arrangements. Like Myrdal, Glenn
Loury claims that stigmatized inequality may be best under-
stood as an outgrowth of a series of vicious circles of cumula-
tive causation.52 This is a recursive process. Because they are
stigmatized, we are justified in affording them less member-
ship, dignity, etc. Because they have less, we are justified in
stigmatizing them. Loury describes the categorizing process
that all humans rationally undergo. We differentiate in order
to make sense of our world, and then we draw inferences
based upon those distinctions to help us make future deci-
sions. Race, while socially constructed, is not the target of his
attack. It is not the objective biological elements of race that
matter, it is the social, subjective perceptions associated with
a race. Moreover, while the inferences might be rational
when analyzing the data or the logic of them, the assump-
tions which underlie them may not be rational. It is difficult
to get at these assumptions; thus they are often taken as
given. Indeed, it may be impossible to even make inferences
at all without making assumptions first-assumptions that
there is rarely reason to question. So the stereotypes passed
down, learned, and associated with race may create a feed-
back loop by which they are perpetuated. If society assumes
that institutional arrangements are just, then the further as-
sumption is that the outcomes are also just, and the explana-
tion for why people are in poverty is that it is their own fault.
"The illusions of false necessity arise because we surrender to
the social world, and then begin to mistake present society for
possible humanity, giving in to the ideas and attitudes that
make the established order seem natural, necessary, or au-
51. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM 160-61 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1930).
52. LOURY, supra note 27, at 52.
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thoritative. '5 The assumptions that underpin the conclusions
which lead to "otherness" are not dislodged because the incen-
tives are not structured in such a way as to make us question
them. Evidence contrary to the assumption is either dis-
missed or ignored. For example, if wealth is a function of
hard work, does that mean that Bill Gates works more than
all thirty-five million African Americans combined, because
he has more wealth than all combined?
54
The other assumption posited for prohibiting the state
from helping proceeds from the first. If "they" are deserving
of their position, an assumption which justifies the denial of
full membership, then they also must be treated harshly be-
cause they are not to be trusted. This second assumption re-
inforces the first. If we are too liberal with bankruptcy laws,
or unemployment insurance, then "these people," who are not
members of the club, will rip us off. We have to crack the
whip and make them suffer or they will not show up at
work--or if they do show up, they will not work to their full
potential. Part of this assumption comes from empirical and
descriptive patterns; the welfare queen fits this composite:
this woman who is black is taking advantage of us-how stu-
pid of us to support welfare when she is driving around in a
pink Cadillac. It generates hostility for these people and sug-
gests a bipolar: we have to lord over them. The bases for
these arguments or what might be called our membership
myths about non-members are that these unfortunate people
are not only outsiders but also undeserving. This argument is
not available to us in a modern democracy.
IV. A RECONEPTION OF THE CITIZEN
John Rawls' rich conception of civic freedom points to a
solution to the problem of otherness. Within his work, Rawls
persistently espouses a deep view of civic freedom that goes
far beyond casting a vote once every four years. If, for Sen,
meaningful civic freedom is dependent upon the removal of
unfreedoms and the granting of greater personal freedom,
Rawls suggests that it is also dependent upon a notion of po-
53. UNGER, supra note 3, at xx.
54. See FORBES.COM, FORBES WORLD'S RICHEST PEOPLE 2004, available at
http://www.forbes.com/maserati/billionaires2004/LIRBH69.html?passListld=1O
+passyear=2004+Passlisttype=person+UniqueId=BH69+datatype=person.
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litical equality. "Since ancient Greece, both in philosophy and
in law, the concept of a person has been that of someone who
can take part in, or play a role in, social life, and hence who
can exercise and respect its various rights and duties."55 This
normative construction of personhood has been predominant
in Western history for over two millennia, yet sadly, for most
of that time, personhood was bestowed to limited segments of
the populace. The rise of the nation-state created a new po-
litical space for personhood (and membership) rooted in citi-
zenship. The effect of this was to limit personhood to citizens.
When citizenship was granted universally, based upon liberal
notions of the enlightenment, personhood became a presump-
tion bestowed to all citizens at birth, and revoked when they
failed to live up to that measure. Only a presumption of
equality among citizens enables citizens to create a social
bond which "is their public political commitment to preserve
the conditions their equal relation requires."56
Understanding why a political conception of equality is a
prerequisite to full citizenship requires a closer examination
of what it means to be a member of a human community. Mi-
chael Walzer asserts that membership is the primary good
that we distribute to one another in human community.57
While Walzer would agree with Sen about the importance of
freedom, it is not above the importance of membership.
Membership is older than freedom. It is prior in time and
importance. Even tribal societies have membership, and be-
55. RAWLS, supra note 33, at 24.
56. Id. at 132.
The fundamental status in political society is to be equal citizenship, a
status that all have as free and equal persons. It is as equal citizens
that we are to have fair access to the fair procedures on which the basic
structure relies. The idea of equality is, then, of significance in itself at
the highest level: it enters into whether political society itself is con-
ceived as a fair system of social cooperation over time between persons
seen as free and equal, or in some other way. It is from this point of
view of equal citizens that the justification of other inequalities is to be
understood. All this enables us to say that in a society well ordered by
the principles of justice as fairness, citizens are equal at the highest
level and in the most fundamental respects. Equality is present at the
highest level in that citizens recognize and view one another as equals.
Their being what they are-citizens-includes their being related as
equals; and their being related as equals is part both of what they are
and of what they are recognized as being by others.
Id.
57. WALZER, supra note 11, at 31.
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ing an alien to that community is a dishonor associated with
social death. Membership is critical because "the state owes
something to its inhabitants simply, without reference to
their collective or national identity."58 In this way, member-
ship is distinct from freedom, yet integrally related. Citizen-
ship is certainly a precondition for the exercise of civic free-
dom, but membership is a critical component to citizenship.
It is therefore understandable that Unger, Rawls, Sen,
and those who believe in robust involvement in civic societies
suggest that need is defined in terms of being a full member
of civic society-not just in terms of poverty. Need is defined
in terms of being an effective participant in civic society with
a view that all other participants are political equals. Rawls
deals with this head on in discussing the differences between
a welfare capitalist society and a private property owning
democracy. A welfare capitalist society is unjust because it
starts off with the premise that the consideration for those
who are struggling is to give them just enough to survive and
that the major service of our concern is capital.
In welfare-state capitalism the aim is that none should fall
below a decent minimum standard of life. []The redistri-
bution of income serves this purpose when, at the end of
each period, those who need assistance can be identified.
Yet given the lack of background justice and inequalities
in income and wealth, there may develop a discouraged
and depressed underclass many of whose members are
chronically dependent on welfare. This underclass feels
left out and does not participate in public political culture.
In property-owning democracy, on the other hand, the aim
is to realize in the basic institutions the idea of society as
a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as
free and equal. To do this, those institutions must, from
the outset, put in the hands of citizens generally, and not
only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be
fully cooperating members of society on a footing of equal-
ity. Among these means is human as well as real capital,
that is knowledge and an understanding of institutions,
educated abilities, and trained skills. Only in this way
can the basic structure realize pure background proce-
dural justice from one generation to the next. 9
58. Id. at 43.
59. RAWLS, supra note 33, at 139-40.
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Rawls is not anti-capital. Instead he suggests that the
major focus is and should be democracy. Support we give to
private property and capital should be in the service of de-
mocracy, not the other way around. In essence, need from the
Rawlsian perspective is a need to discover how to make sure
that we are all members. The difficulty in getting there is
that we have different sectors and different clubs so that
those in the elite are willing to'extend benefits and considera-
tions to fellow members while they extend a different set of
benefits and considerations to those outside the club. This
has to be challenged. If we do not challenge it and just as-
sume the need to keep people alive or protect property, we are
undermining any good faith effort at meeting human need.
The extension and maintenance of membership to all re-
quires a presumption of equality among citizens in the politi-
cal sphere. Such a conception of a person and citizen requires
social insurance. In the "original position" representatives
deciding under a veil of ignorance for their constituents would
promise or arrange a minimum level of security or social in-
surance for all. The possibility that one might be forced un-
willingly to withdraw from civic life risks sacrificing the po-
litical conception of a citizen as someone who can be free and
can participate over a complete life. "The concept of the ap-
propriate minimum is not given by the basic needs of human
nature taken psychologically (or biologically) apart from any
particular social world. Rather, it depends on the fundamen-
tal intuitive ideas of person and society in terms of justice as
fairness laid out."r° In this way the concept of a social mini-
mum is contextual, not logically deducible from the premises
of human nature but dependent upon how political society it-
self is conceived by the accepted political conception of justice.
In line with the notion of an appropriate minimum,
Rawls argues for a guarantee of primary goods to all citizens:
primary goods are things needed and required by persons
in light of the political conception of person, as citizens
who are fully cooperating members of society. . . . These
goods are things citizens need as free and equal persons
living a complete life; they are not things it is simply ra-
61tional to want or desire, or to prefer or even crave.
60. Id. at 132.
61. Id. at 58.
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In other words, the primary goods are required for exercising
and enjoying civic and personal freedoms. Therefore, one of
the roles of the basic structure is to "provide the background
institutions of social and economic justice in the form most
appropriate to citizens as free and equal."62
For this reason, one of Rawl's principles of justice is the
difference principle, that social and economic inequalities are
to "be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members
of society."63 What this specifically means is that the opti-
mum production point of society is where both the more well
off and the least well off gain at each unit of production. Be-
yond the equal justice point of the difference principle, the
more well off gain at the expense of the less well off, not re-
ciprocally with the less well off.' The reason for such a struc-
ture is that it encourages "a sense of being treated fairly in
view of the public principles which are seen as effectively
regulating economic and social inequalities." 5
[I]f [citizens] who view themselves and their society [as
free and equal, and to regard society as a fair system of
social cooperation over time] are not to withdraw from
their public world but rather to consider themselves full
members of it, the social minimum, whatever it may pro-
vide beyond essential human needs, must derive from an
idea of reciprocity appropriate to political society so con-
ceived. While a social minimum covering only those es-
sential needs may suit the requirements of a capitalist
welfare state, it is not sufficient for.. . a property-owning
democracy in which the principles of justice as fairness are
realized.66
Rawls' view of a primary index of goods is given more
substance in replying to a critique from Sen. 7 Rawls claims
that his conception of a primary index of goods is convergent
with Sen's notion of basic capabilities.
[T]he idea of primary goods is closely connected with the
conception of citizens as having basic capabilities, among
the most important being the two moral powers. What
those goods are depends on the fundamental intuitive idea
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 62-63.
65. RAWLS, supra note 33, at 57.
66. Id. at 130.
67. See id. at 169-76; see also SEN, supra note 15, at 63-65.
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of citizens as person with those powers, and with a higher-
order interest in their development and exercise. 8
This accords with Sen's view that basic capabilities must be
taken into account not only in making interpersonal compari-
sons, but in laying out a reasonable political conception of jus-
tice.
What Rawls and Sen both point to is a redefinition of
what it means to be in need. The question is not what do
people need to survive; it is what do people need to be a full
member of society-and as such have the agency and capacity
to become, for Rawls, moral agents with a conception of the
good, and for Sen, capable citizens of influencing their own
future.
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset, I briefly sketched a few predominant no-
tions of need. Two models currently animate the discourse.
The first model I will refer to generally as the conservative
model. This model suggests that people are basically evil (or
lazy).69 As such, force and power are needed to constantly de-
press the evil, and to motivate people to good.76 At the core,
the conservative model suggests that people are best directed
through incentives and disincentives. Harsh prison sen-
tences, strong armies, and the threat of the death penalty are
needed to motivate people to behave. This is the Hobbesian
model: the state has to mediate the coming out of the state of
nature.7 It was built upon in more sophisticated terms by
Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents- it is discontentment
that generates our productivity." Unhappy people are driven
to create and bring about a better world, or, at the least, are
stimulated to think deeply about social conditions and the
human predicament. Happy people do not write and prefer
not to work or produce anything of importance. Arguably, the
Greeks produced the most prolific number of thinkers in hu-
man history, and they were among the most discontented.
68. RAWLS, supra note 33, at 175.
69. KEN WILBER, UP FROM EDEN 332 (1996).
70. See id.; see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 93 (Richard E. Flathman
& David Johnston eds., 1997).
71. HOBBES, supra note 70, at 93.
72. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Stracky
ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1961) (1929).
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In equally sophisticated, but more nuanced terms, the
conservative model informs, and actually underpins neoclas-
sical economics. The assumption is that people will pursue
their own individual interests, acting and reacting to various
incentives and disincentives such as price changes or hunger.
Poverty avoidance and need for income stimulate a desire to
work, motivating people to forgo further leisure time in favor
of income, which may be exchanged for goods and services
valued at greater utility than additional leisure time. In pur-
suing selfish ends, under that model, they increase the wel-
fare of society.
The legitimacy of this model is based upon the assump-
tion, first, that equal opportunity exists and that wealth is a
function of hard work. Therefore, those who work hard
should not be in poverty. In order to maintain equal opportu-
nity to the next generation, a bare minimum of resources may
necessarily be transferred to the poor in order to secure the
background legitimacy of the first assumption (in that we do
not want children to starve). The second assumption is that
structural arrangements are neutral and legitimate. In order
to maintain the proper incentives for work, this model sug-
gests that any conception of need has to be mindful of the po-
tential to disincentivize work.
The first assumption is vulnerable to attack in many
ways. It ignores that millions work hard in minimum pay
jobs and cannot make a living wage. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it ignores that poverty is relative-that it often de-
pends on the relative wealth in the society-and ignores the
fact that unfreedoms block opportunities for individuals to
improve their lot. In other words, this model tends to ignore
the way in which structures inhibit the agency of individuals.
Then there are those who have a more robust conception
of need. The liberal model is based upon the assumption that
people are essentially good. For liberals, institutions and
structures interfere with goodness or create potential inequi-
ties. Freeing people from those constraints will allow people
to find their goodness. Perhaps the most profound philoso-
pher in recent terms who talks about the goodness of people is
Dr. Spock: remove all structures and let the kids run wild;
then they will find their natural goodness.73 Under this
73. See generally BENJAMIN SPOCK, DR SPOCK'S BABY AND CHILD CARE (7th
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model, one might have a more generous model of need-often
associated with a welfare safety net-to help people from ex-
periencing degradation or extreme poverty. The idea is that
structures are not always neutral or legitimate, and correc-
tions need to be made for in unfair circumstances. This spurs
development of further institutional structures and programs
designed to compensate for institutional inequity. This model
falters for several reasons. One criticism is that it provides
measures which disincentivize behavior that would help get
people out of poverty. Further, it ignores that people may
both be the products of institutional structures, or become, in
some way, oppressed by structures designed to help them.
Both models suffer from pluralistic skepticism and ambiguity.
However, those two models continue to animate the discus-
sion.74 Are people basically bad or good?
There is a third alternative, partially set out by late and
post-modernists, that our nature, if there is such a thing, is
not set. The institutional structures are not distributed in
terms of primary goods, but are distributive of self and iden-
tity. These institutions and structures produce, in some
ways, the very people they are supposed to serve. The reali-
zation of institutional non-neutrality and potential formative
causation plays nicely into the capabilities approach. Roberto
Unger has thought deeply about the notion of what he calls "a
formative context." The crucial point that he makes is that
the formative context is made up of two critical elements: it is
first the "order, framework, or structure of social life" but it is
also imaginative." "It consists in a set of enacted preconcep-
tions about the possible and desirable forms of human asso-
ciation: assumptions about what relations among people
should be like in different domains of social existence.76
Unger suggests that in Western democracies we set aside the
imaginative element-but perhaps this is not so. In Ameri-
can society our ideals are often shaped by our context in a cy-
cle of causation. The narrative story of the nation's formation
ed. 1998).
74. "The dominant project [either the conservative or the liberal model]
trusts 'social safety nets,' financed by tax-and-transfer, to redress these ine-
qualities in the short run. It trusts education to prevent them in the long run.
Historical experience fails to support either hope." UNGER, supra note 3, at
lxviii.
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id.
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and the founding documents point to an ideal that has been
expressed time and again. The context is the framework, but
the Constitution inspires the imaginative ideals of the people
to make course corrections, striving to those ideals. It is in
this way that institutions may also be distributive of self and
identify, at the same time that they provide the actual
framework in which we live.
When we look at what is happening in society, it is clear
that the welfare state is too narrowly framed to begin with,
and in discussing the role of the state, we are losing ground.
The discussion needs to be broadened on several levels. In
terms of geography, perhaps the discussion needs to be on a
transnational or global level, such as what is coming out of
the United Nations.
As we engage in this discussion, we cannot understand it
from only one perspective. It is informed by what we think of
the state and the people and what meaning is about. Not
only is membership distributed, but meaning itself is.
If we frame the discussion of need in a larger way, not
just in terms of a safety net to avoid starvation, but as the ca-
pacity of members to participate in the constitution of these
institutions and structures themselves, then we may be able
to meet human needs. Otherwise, there will always be fail-
ure.
Central to this discussion has been the issue of member-
ship. There is an implicit understanding that even after we
have identified legitimate social needs and the role of gov-
ernment in responding, we are primarily talking about mem-
bers. A question that we have not yet addressed is who is a
member and who is not a member. Virtually all social theo-
rists recognize that the state has a different obligation to its
members than to non-members." There is also an assump-
tion that the state has a legitimate interest in not only re-
sponding to its members but also in limiting who can be a
member. This question is at the heart of many of the most
important social issues that this country has faced or will
face. Many people believe that Dred Scott pushed the Civil
War onto the national agenda."8 One way to understand Dred
77. See JOHN RAwLs, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); see also supra notes 57-
58 and accompanying text.
78. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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Scott is that it is about membership in our imagined commu-
nity. More particularly, could free blacks or slaves be consid-
ered part of this community? This was, and is possibly, the
most defining case in United States history. Segregation un-
der Jim CroW9 and later embraced in PessjP' is an extension
of the same issue. The civil rights movement is essentially an
effort to make a practical and legal claim about membership
and the rights that attach to membership.
It is also interesting to note that in Dred Scott, the Su-
preme Court asserted that only the federal government could
confer citizenship, not the states."' After the Civil War, the
Privilege and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment attempted to correct Dred Scott and confer citizenship
on blacks.82 But the Supreme Court substantially under-
mined the citizenship implication of the Privilege and Immu-
nities Clause. In a case about the right to work as an inci-
dent of national citizenship, the Supreme Court rendered the
Privilege and Immunities Clause ineffective and instead re-
turned the matters of citizenship rights for the free slaves
and others back to the states."' In Dred Scott, the states were
trying to protect the rights of slaves and extend membership
to them if they traveled to a free state. The Court found that
the states had no authority to extend citizenship, because this
is a matter for the federal government. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made it
clear that free slaves and others were to be given the privi-
leges and immunities of national citizenship. In the Slaugh-
79. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
80. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
81. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
83. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872):
The language is, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." It
is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the
citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that
the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so carefully
used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States, in
the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that
the change in phraseology was adopted understandingly and with a
purpose.
Id. In the words of Charles Black Jr., "[i]n the exact etymological sense, the
Court annihilated the privileges and immunities of national citizens, inso-
far as these were to be seen as ordained by the Fourteenth Amendment."
CHARLES L. BLACK JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 55 (1997).
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ter-House Cases, the Supreme Court found that this clause
was virtually meaningless, as most of the privileges associ-
ated with citizenship were offered by the state. The Slaugh-
ter-House Cases have been called the most important and
worst cases in U.S. history.' Recently, the Supreme Court
has found some meaning to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and that there are privileges associated with being a
citizen of the United States. But what rights and immunities
should be associated with citizenship in the United States?
In Brown and Grutter, the Supreme Court strongly suggested
that education should be a right for all citizens. 5 And in a
democracy, there can be no doubt that voting would also be
among those privileges and immunities.8 What would this
reading do to our present understanding of education law?
There, the impact on felony disenfranchisement that contin-
ues to elude many black, brown, and white felons from full
membership in their respective states would have to be re-
viewed.
In addition to the claim of blacks and other marginalized
racial and ethnic groups to be full members of this political
community called the United States, there is also the ques-
tion about new immigrants and their status as members. I
cannot fully address these important issues here, but would
like to share some thoughts. A number of writers have as-
serted that it is the role of the state to protect and help ad-
dress the social needs of its members. 7 It may be that in the
age of global capitalism, the rationale for the boundaries of
members and non-members should be reconsidered. Maybe
we need some more nuanced gradation besides members and
non-members. In a period where capital is increasingly free
to move across national boundaries with national and inter-
national protection, does it make sense to confine labor to one
nation-state with little protections? This may create a struc-
tural inequality that both undermines the legitimate role of
the state and renders the worker and the citizen unable to
84. BLACK, supra note 83, at 55.
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2004).
86. For a more extensive list, see John Denvir, Democracy's Constitution
(2001).
87. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 11; supra note 59 and accompanying text;
see also LESTER C. THuROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 294 (1996) (arguing
that the role of government is to mediate democracy and capitalism).
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engage effectively in a meaningful discourse about needs.88
In this article there are a number of issues touched on in
thinking about needs and the role of government in address-
ing those needs. There is skepticism of foundationalism in
defining and thinking about needs.89 This is not a relativistic
approach. Instead it entails a much greater reliance and im-
portance on the democratic ideals and the importance on par-
ticipation." We return then to the questions asked at the be-
ginning of this article. What are our needs and what is the
government responsibility to address these needs? These
turn out to be interrelated questions about the legitimacy of
government as well as the social understanding of need.
What I have asserted in this article is that both of these ques-
tions are joined around the issue of participation or civil en-
gagement. It is through civil engagement that we identify
our social needs, prioritize them, and assign the role of gov-
ernment to actualize them. This does not mean until then we
are looking at an empty vessel. Instead, it suggests, in the
spirit of Unger, Rawls, Sen, and Walzer, that we recognize
that the first good to be addressed is that of membership and
the civil participation and engagement that goes with it in a
democratic society.
88. UNGER supra note 3, at cx ("The basic regime should favor a range of
solutions encouraging the connected and gradual development of more transna-
tional mobility for capital and labor, rather than leaving capital free and labor
unfree."). Unger earlier emphasizes the "extreme contrast between freedom for
capital to cross borders and imprisonment of labor within the nation-state." Id.
at lv.
89. For a discussion on the limit of foundational thinking and an alterna-
tive, see john powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equal-
ity, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 11 (1997):
Most of us operate from one of these narratives rather than the other.
When a problem arises, one sees the problem from the narrative or
world view in which one lives and then proceeds to analyze the problem
from that same narrative. In most instances, people are unaware of
the extent to which they operate within a particular conceptual frame-
work or even that there are other, competing frameworks. Obviously, if
one is either unaware of alternative narratives or is aware, but simply
asserts the )riority of one's own conceptual framework, there is no seri-
ous engagement between the competing narratives.
Id.
90. Id. at 94.

